some twenty miles long and twelve miles wide, had thrown half a dozen pontoon bridges across the river, and installed more heavy artillery on the right bank. An area some ten miles deep around the pocket was under continuous enemy fire. Our troops were rolling back slowly. All attempts to provide them with artillery support failed; the enemy knew all the spots we could use for artillery positions and bombed them relentlessly, while our batteries, rushed from the rear to the front, got hopelessly mixed up. Some lost their way, others had no ammunition or had the wrong caliber.

Because of the poor maneuverability of our troops, the Germans could advance through the gaps in our lines. A German regiment did not mind being surrounded, while our troops withdrew as soon as they noticed that the enemy was on their flanks and at their rear. It seemed as though the enemy would overrun our flimsy defense lines, but somehow fresh troops appeared in the gap and the German advance units were temporarily stopped or pushed back. Meanwhile, however, the enemy had gained ground at some other point. In three days the Germans advanced ten to twelve miles in this way.

There would have been no sense in appealing to the soldiers. Well or not very well, they did what they were ordered to do. All Boldyrev asked of me was to talk with officers and soldiers' representatives, trying to explain to them the significance of our rear-guard delaying operation. I drove back and forth as a liaison man between the corps and its allegedly cut-off units, thus demonstrating to the men and officers that the roads were passable and they were not surrounded. At dawn on September 4, I wired the government, the War Department, and the Executive Committee: "Developing his initial success, the enemy is continuing to advance, and our troops are retreating. There has been no flight from the battlefield, no disobedience of orders. The source of our weakness is lack of self-confidence of the troops, their insufficient training for maneuvering, and the enemy's superiority in firepower. We have suffered heavy losses but many units are fighting as bravely as in the first days. In others, fatigue is noticeable."

Headquarters of the 43rd Corps was located some two miles from the battle lines, not more than ten miles from the nearest point on the Riga-Pskov highway. Unexpectedly, the Germans began to turn northward in an enveloping movement around Riga, bringing reinforcement to their left wing but diminishing the pressure on our lines. Our troops launched an attack against the enemy's exposed right flank. This operation gave the Army Command two more days to complete the evacuation of Riga. Not until September 7 did the Germans enter the city. The Twelfth Army had been evacuated to its last unit, with hospitals, artillery, and munitions.

That same day I drove to Venden, where I found Emma, who had